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Abstract—Timely patching is paramount to safeguard users and maintainers against dire consequences of malicious attacks. In
practice, patching is prioritized following the nature of the code change that is committed in the code repository. When such a change is
labeled as being security-relevant, i.e., as fixing a vulnerability, maintainers rapidly spread the change and users are notified about the
need to update to a new version of the library or of the application. Unfortunately, oftentimes, some security-relevant changes go
unnoticed as they represent silent fixes of vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose a Co-Training-based approach to catch security
patches as part of an automatic monitoring service of code repositories. Leveraging different classes of features, we empirically show
that such an automation is feasible and can yield a precision of over 90% in identifying security patches, with an unprecedented recall
of over 80%. Beyond such a benchmarking with ground truth data which demonstrates an improvement over the state-of-the-art, we
confirmed that our approach can help catch security patches that were not reported as such.
Index Terms—Vulnerability, Change analysis, Co-Training
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1 INTRODUCTION
IN the last couple of years, our digital world was shakenby two of the most widespread malware outbreaks to
date, namely WannaCry and Petya. Interestingly, both lever-
aged a known exploit with an available patch [1]. Despite
the availability of such a patch that could have prevented an
infection, a large number of systems around the globe were
impacted, leading to a loss of over 4 billion US dollars [2].
In a typical scenario of vulnerability correction, a developer
proposes changes bundled as a software patch by pushing
a commit (i.e., patch + description of changes) which is an-
alyzed by the project maintainer, or a chain of maintainers,
who eventually reject or apply the changes to the master
branch. When the patch is accepted and released, all users
of the relevant code must apply it to limit their exposure to
attacks. The reality, however, is that, for most organizations,
there is a lag between a patch release and its application.
While in the cases of critical systems, maintainers are hes-
itant to deploy updates that will hinder operations with
downtime, in many other cases, the lag is due to the fact
that the proposed change has not been properly advertised
as security-relevant, and is not thus viewed as critical.
Patching is an absolute necessity. Timely patching of
vulnerabilities in software, however, mainly depends on
the tags associated to the change, such as the commit log
message, or on the availability of references in public vulner-
ability databases. For example, nowadays, developers and
system maintainers rely on information from the National
Vulnerability Database [3] to react to all disclosed vulnera-
bilities. Unfortunately, a recent study on the state of open
source security [4] revealed that only 9% of maintainers
file for a Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) ID
after releasing a fix to a vulnerability. The study further
reports that 25% of open source software projects completely
silently fix vulnerabilities without disclosing them to any
official repository.
Silent vulnerability fixes are a concern for third-party
developers and users alike. Given the low coverage of
official vulnerability repositories, there are initiatives in
the software industry to automatically and systematically
monitor source code repositories in real-time for identify-
ing security-relevant commits, for example by parsing the
commit logs [5]. Manual analysis of code changes is indeed
heavy in terms of manpower constraints, requires expert
knowledge, and can be error-prone.
Our work deals with the automation of the identification of
security patches (i.e., patches fixing vulnerabilities) once a
commit is contributed to a code base. To align with realistic
constraintsa of practitioners, we only leverage information
available within the commit.
a. In practice, identifying security patches must be done at
commit-time. An approach would be very successful if it could
leverage future comments of bug reports and advisories inputs (e.g.,
CVE). Such information is however not available in reality when the
commit is made.
In this paper, we investigate the possibility to apply ma-
chine learning techniques to automate the identification of
source code changes that actually represent security patches.
To that end, we investigate three different classes of features
related to the change metadata (e.g., commit logs), the code
change details (e.g., number of lines modified), as well as
specific traits that are recurrent in vulnerabilities (e.g., array
index change). We then build on the insight that analysts
can independently rely either on commit logs or on code
change details to suspect a patch of addressing a vulner-
ability. Thus, we propose to build a Co-Training approach
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2where two classifiers leverage separately text features and
code features to eventually learn an effective model. This
semi-supervised learning approach further accounts for the
reality that the datasets available in practice include a large
portion of samples whose labels (i.e., “security-relevant” or not)
are unknown. Overall, we make the following contributions:
• We motivate and dissect the problem of identifying
security-relevant code changes. In particular, we investi-
gate the discriminative power of a variety of features to
clarify the possibility of a learning process.
• We propose a semi-supervised approach with Co-
Training [6] which we demonstrate to yield high preci-
sion (95%) and recall (88%). This represents a significant
improvement over the state-of-the-art.
• Finally, we show that our approach can help flag patches
that were unlabeled until now. We have confirmed our
findings by manual analysis, with the help of external
expertise.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
motivate our study and enumerate related work in Section 2.
Section 3 describes our approach while Section 4 presents
the experimental study and results. Section 5 discusses
threats to validity and future work. Section 6 concludes this
work.
2 MOTIVATION & RELATED WORK
The identification of security-relevant commits has appli-
cations for various stakeholders in software development.
The literature includes a number of related work that we
summarize in this section.
2.1 Motivating cases
The urgency of updating a software given a proposed
change is assessed at different levels of the software de-
velopment cycle. We consider the cases of developer-
maintainer and maintainer-user communications.
(1) Patch processing delays by maintainers. We consider the
case of the Linux kernel, which is developed according to a
hierarchical open source model referred to as Benevolent
dictator for life (BDFL) [7]. In this model, anyone can
contribute, but ultimately all contributions are integrated
by a single person, Linus Torvalds, into the mainline de-
velopment tree. A Linux kernel maintainer receives patches
related to a particular file or subsystem from developers or
more specialized maintainers. After evaluating and locally
committing them, he/she propagates them upwards in the
maintainer hierarchy, eventually up to Linus Torvalds. Since
the number of maintainers is significantly lower than that of
contributors, there is a delay between a patch authoring date
and its commit date. A recent study, however, has shown
that author patches for Linux are addressed in a timely
manner by maintainers [8]. Nevertheless, given the critical
nature of a security patch, we expect its processing to be
even more speedy if the commit message contains relevant
information that attracts maintainers’ attention.
Figure 1 illustrates the delay computed on randomly
sampled sets of 1 000 commits where the log clearly con-
tained a CVE reference, and 1 000 commits with no such
references. The delay is computed as the difference of time
between the contribution date (i.e., Author date in git) and
the date it was accepted in the repository (i.e., Commit date
in git). The boxplots show how patches that are explicitly
related to vulnerabilities are validated faster than other
patches: on median average, security patches are validated
fifteen hours faster. We confirmed that the difference is
statistically significant with MWW tests [9].
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Fig. 1: Delays for validating contributor patches in Linux
If proper notice is given, maintainers are likely to prioritize
the validation and propagation of security patches.
(2) Version release delays for users. In the development cycle
of software, versioning allows maintainers to fix milestones
with regards to the addition of new features, or the stabiliza-
tion of a well-tested branch after the application of several
bug fixes. However, when a security patch is applied to the
code base, it is common to see maintainers release a new
version early to protect users against potential attacks. To
confirm that this is indeed common, we consider the case
of the OpenSSL library and compare the delay between
a given commit and the subsequent version release date
(which is inferred by checking commits with version tags).
The delay was computed for all the 1 550 OpenSSL commits
(495 of which carry security patches) collected in our study
datasets.
Boxplot representations in Figure 2 show that many
OpenSSL versions are released just after security patches. In
contrast, the gap between any other commit and a version
release is bigger: releases are made on average seven days
after a security patch, but about twenty days after other
types of patches.
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Fig. 2: Comparative delays for OpenSSL release after a
security patch vs after any other patch
To reduce user exposure, it is necessary to release new
versions when vulnerabilities are patched. To that end, it
is critical to identify such security patches.
2.2 Related work
Our work is related to several research directions in the liter-
ature, most notably studies on 1) vulnerability management,
2) the application of machine learning in software mainte-
nance tasks, 3) change analysis, and 4) commit classification.
2.2.1 Vulnerability management
Recently, the topic of Autonomous Cyber Reasoning Sys-
tem [10] has attracted extensive attention from both industry
and academia, with the development of new techniques
to automate the detection, exploitation, and patching of
software vulnerabilities in a scalable and cost-effective way.
Static analysis approaches such as the code property graph
3by Yamaguchi et al. [11] require a built model of vulner-
abilities based on expert knowledge. Dynamic approaches
leverage fuzzing to test a software with intentionally invalid
inputs to discover unknown vulnerabilities [12], [13], or
exploit taint analyses to track marked information flow
through a program as it executes in order to detect most
types of vulnerabilities [14], including leaks [15]. Such ap-
proaches, although very precise, are known to be expen-
sive, and achieve a limited code coverage [16]. Recently,
researchers have been investigating concolic analysis [17]
tools for software security. Mayhem [18] is an example of
such a system.
The literature includes a number of approaches that use
software metrics to highlight code regions that are more
likely to contain vulnerabilities. Metrics such as code churn
and code complexity along with organizational measures
(e.g., team size, working hours) allowed to achieve high
precision in a large scale empirical study of vulnerabilities
in Windows Vista [19]. However, Jay et al. [20] have warned
that many of these metrics may be highly correlated with
lines of code, suggesting that such detection techniques
are not helpful in reducing the amount of code to read to
discover the actual vulnerable piece of code.
Nowadays, researchers are exploring machine learn-
ing techniques to improve the performance of automatic
software vulnerability detection, exploitation, and patch-
ing [10], [21]. For example, Scandariato et al. [22] have
trained a classifier on textual features extracted from source
code to determine vulnerable software components. Several
unsupervised learning approaches have been presented to
assist in the discovery of vulnerabilities [23], [24]. We differ
from these approaches both in terms of objectives, and in
the use of a combination of features from code and meta-
data. With respect to feature learning, new deep learning-
based approaches [21] are being proposed since they do
not require expert intervention to generate features. The
models are however mostly opaque [25] for analysts who
require explainability of decisions during audits. Finally, it
is noteworthy that the industry is starting to share with
the research community some datasets yielded by manual
curation efforts of security experts [26].
2.2.2 Machine learning for software maintenance
The research on applying machine learning to automate
software maintenance tasks has been very active in recent
years. We refer the reader to a recent survey by Allamanis
et al. [27]. In such approaches, researchers rely on the
naturalness [28] of software code to build prediction models.
Our work also falls under these categories as we build on
the assumption that security patches have discriminating
features with respect to other patches (whether bug fix
patches or enhancement patches).
2.2.3 Change analysis
Software change is a fundamental ingredient of software
maintenance [29]. Software changes are often applied to
comply to new requirements, to fix bugs, to address change
requests, and so on. When such changes are made, in-
evitably, some expected and unexpected effects may ensue,
even beyond the software code. Software change impact
analysis has been studied in the literature as a collection
of techniques for determining the effects of the proposed
changes on other parts of the software [30].
Researchers have further investigated a number of pre-
diction approaches related to software changes, including
by analysing co-change patterns to predict source code
changes [31]. Closely related to ours is the work of Tian et
al. [32] who propose a learning model to identify Linux bug
fixing patches. The motivation of their work is to improve
the propagation of fixes upwards the mainline tree. Our
approach, however, is substantially different regarding: (1)
Objective: [32] targets Linux development, and identifies bug
fixes. We are focused on security patches. (2) Method: [32]
leverages the classification algorithm named Learning from
Positive and Unlabeled Examples (LPU) [33]. In contrast,
we explore Co-Training which requires two independent
views of the data. We also include a more security-sensitive
set of features. We explore a combination of latent (e.g.,
#sizeof) and explicit (e.g., keyword) features. (3) Evaluation:
[32] was evaluated against a keyword-based approach. We
evaluate against the state-of-the-art and based on manual
audit. All data is released and made available for replication.
Following up on the work of Tian et al. [32], Hoang et al.
have proposed a deep learning-based tool for classifying
bug fix commits [34].
Security analysis of commits has been investigated by
Perl et al. [35] who presented VCCFinder for flagging sus-
picious commits by using an SVM classifier. In contrast
to our work, VCCFinder aims at identifying vulnerability-
introducing changes, while, conversely, we aim for identify-
ing those changes that fix vulnerabilities.
2.2.4 Commit classification
Recently, researchers from the security industry [5], [36]
(from SourceClear, Inc. and SAP respectively) have pre-
sented early investigations on the prediction of secu-
rity issues in relation with commit changes. Zhou and
Asankhaya [5] focus on commit logs, commit metadata
and associated bug reports, and leverage regular expres-
sions to identify features for predicting security-relevant
commits. The authors use embedding (word2vec) to learn
the features, which leads to an opaque decision-making
system [25], [37] when it comes to guiding a security analyst
in his/her auditing tasks. The approach is further limited
since experimental data show that not all fixes are linked to
reported bugs, and not all developers know (or want to dis-
close in logs) that they are fixing vulnerabilities. Sabetta and
Bezzi [36] improve over the work of Zhou and Asankhaya
by considering code changes as well. Their approach is
fully-supervised (thus, assuming that the labeled dataset is
perfect and sufficient).
Closely related work in identifying security patches are
contributed so far by the industry. Nevertheless, various
academic works rely on scarce data to train machine learning
models for vulnerability detection, exploitation or patching.
Our work will enable the amplification of such datasets
(beyond the disclosed security patches), to include silent
fixes, thus increasing the coverage and reliability of the state-
of-the-art.
43 APPROACH
Our work addresses a binary classification problem of
distinguishing security patches from other patches: we con-
sider a combination of text analysis of commit logs and code
analysis of commit changes diff to catch security patches. To
that end, we proceed to the extraction of “facts” from text
and code, and then perform a feature engineering that
we demonstrate to be efficient for discriminating security
patches from other patches. Finally, we learn a prediction
model using machine learning classification techniques.
In a typical classification task, an appropriately labeled
training dataset is available. In our setting, however, this
is not the case as introduced earlier: in our dataset, when
a commit is attached to a CVE, we can guarantee that it
does provide a security patch; when the commit does not
mention a CVE, we cannot assume that it does not provide
a security patch. Therefore, for positive data, i.e., security
patches, we can leverage the limited dataset of patches that
have been listed in vulnerability databases (e.g., the NVD).
There is, however, no corresponding set of independently
labeled negative data, i.e., non-security patches, given that
developers may silently fix their vulnerable code. This prob-
lem was raised in previous work on the identification of bug
fixing patches by Tian et al. [32]. Nevertheless, our setting
requires even more refined analysis since security patches
can be easily confused with a mere non-security-relevant
bug fix. To address the problem of having a small set of
labeled data and a large set of unlabeled data for security
patches, we consider a Co-Training [6] approach where we
combine two models, each trained with features extracted
from two disjoint aspects (commit message vs. code diff) of
our dataset. This process has been shown to be one of the
most effective techniques for semi-supervised learning [38].
Concretely, our Co-Training approach considers commit
logs, on the one hand, and code diffs, on the other hand, as
redundant views of the changes, given that the former de-
scribes the latter. Then we train two separate classifiers, one
for each view, that are iterated by exchanging labeled data
until they agree on classification decisions (cf. Section 3.4).
In this section, we first provide information on the data
acquisition (cf. Section 3.1), on feature engineering (cf. Sec-
tion 3.2) and assessment (cf. Section 3.3). Then, we present
the Co-Training approach (cf. Section 3.4).
3.1 Data Collection
For most modern software, developers rely on the git
version control system. Git makes available the history of
changes that have been made to the code base in the form
of a series of patches. Thus, a patch constitutes a thorough
summary of a code change, describing the modification that
a developer has made to the source code at the time of a
commit. Typically, a patch as depicted in Figure 3, includes
two artifacts: a) the log message in which the developer
describes the change in natural language; b) the diff which
represents the changes that are to be applied. The illustrated
vulnerability, as in many cases, is due to a missing constraint
that leaves a window for attackers to exploit.
For our experiments, we consider three projects whose
code is widespread among IT systems: the Linux kernel
development project, the OpenSSL library project and the
Wireshark network protocol analyzer. For each project, we
commit 5ebff5337594d690b322078c512eb222d34aaa82
Author: Michal Schmidt <anonymized@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Mar 2 10:39:10 2012 +0100
util: never follow symlinks in rm_rf_children()
The function checks if the entry is a directory
before recursing, but there is a window between
the check and the open, during which the
directory could be replaced with a symlink.
CVE-2012-1174
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=803358
diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
index 20cbc2b0d..dfc1dc6b8 100644
--- a/src/util.c
+++ b/src/util.c
@@ -3593,7 +3593,8 @@ static int rm_rf_children(int fd,...) {
if (is_dir) {
int subdir_fd;
- if((subdir_fd = openat(fd, de->d_name, O_RDONLY|...)) < 0){
+ subdir_fd = openat(fd, de->d_name, O_RDONLY|...|O_NOFOLLOW);
+ if (subdir_fd < 0) {
if (ret == 0 && errno != ENOENT)
ret = -errno;
continue;
Fig. 3: Example of a security patch in the OpenSSL library
attempt to collect positive and negative data for the classical
binary classification task, as well as the unlabeled data for
our semi-supervised learning scenario:
• Positive data (i.e., security patches). We collect patches
reported as part of security advisories, and thus known
to be addressing a known and reported vulnerability.
• Negative data (i.e., non-security patches). We use heuristics
to build the dataset of negative data. To ensure that it
is unbiased and representative, we explicitly consider
different cases of non-security patches, and transparently
collect these sets separately with a clear process to enable
replication. Concretely, we consider:
– Pure bug fixing patches. We collect patches that are
known to fix bugs in project code, but that are not
security-relevant.
– Code enhancement patches. We collect patches that are
not about fixing bugs or vulnerabilities. Such patches
may be delivered by commits to perform code cleaning,
feature addition, performance enhancement, etc.
• Unlabeled data. We finally collect patches that are about
fixing the code, but for which we do not yet know whether
it is about fixing a vulnerability or non-security bugs.
The creation of these datasets is summarized in Figure 4
and detailed in the following paragraphs.
security 
patches
pure bug-fix 
patches
code-enhanc.
patches unlabeled 
patches
Explicitly related 
to a CVE
Negative data:
non-security patches
Positive data:
security patches Don’t know yet if 
security patches
Explicitly related to a bug in a tracking 
system and not related to security
Commit logs checking: 
Not related to bug, security, …
Unlabeled  data:
Fig. 4: Distinct subsets of the dataset built for our experiments
3.1.1 Security patches (for positive datasets)
We acquire security patches by leveraging a recent frame-
work proposed by Jimenez et al. [39] for automated collec-
tion of vulnerability instances from software archives. The
framework builds upon the National Vulnerability Database
information and attempts to connect such information with
other sources such as bug tracking systems and git reposito-
ries. The data recovered include information, for each item,
5about the CVE ID, the CVE description, the time of creation,
the associated bug ids from the project bug tracking system,
the list of impacted software versions, and the list of com-
mits that fixed the vulnerability. Overall, as of July 2018, we
managed to retrieve 1 398, 986, and 495 security patches for
Linux, Wireshark, and OpenSSL respectively.
3.1.2 Pure bug fixing patches (for negative datasets)
To ensure that our approach can effectively differentiate
security-relevant fixes from other fixes, we set to collect a
dataset of non-security-relevant patches following conser-
vative heuristics. First, we consider patches that are not
reported in a security advisory, and whose commit logs do
not include “vulnerability” or “security” keywords. Then,
we focus on those patches whose commits are linked to a
bug reported in a bug tracking system. Finally, we ensure
that the bug report itself does not hint at a potential security
issue. For that, we follow the approach proposed by security
analysts Zhou and Asankhaya [5], and drop all cases where
the bug report matches the regular expression provided in
Table 1. Overall, with this method, we managed to retrieve
1 934 and 2 477 pure bug fixing patches for Linux, Wireshark
respectively. Our dataset does not contain any pure bug-fix
patches for OpenSSL due to missing links between commits
and bug reports of OpenSSL. Future work could consider
using state-of-the-art bug linking approaches [40], [41], [42].
TABLE 1: Regular expression used to filter out security-
related issues described in bug reports
(?i)(denial.of.service|\bXXE\b|remote.code.execution
|\bopen.redirect|OSVDB|\vuln|\CVE\b|\bXSS\b|\bReDoS\b
|\bNVD\b|malicious|x-frame-options|attack|cross.site
|exploit|directory.traversal|\bRCE\b|\bdos\b|\bXSRF\b
|clickjack|session.fixation|hijack|advisory|insecure
|security|\bcross-origin\b|unauthori[z|s]ed
|infinite.loop|authenticat(e|ion)|bruteforce|bypass
|constant.time|crack|credential|\bDoS\b|expos(e|ing)
|hack|harden|injection|lockout|overflow|password
|\bPoC\b|proof.of.concept|poison|privilege
|\b(in)?secur(e|ity)|(de)?serializ|spoof|timing|traversal)
3.1.3 Code enhancement patches (for negative datasets)
To ensure that our model will not be overfitted to the
cases of fixing patches, we collect noise dataset represented
by commits that enhance the code base with new feature
additions. We thus set to build a parser of commit logs for
identifying such commits. To that end, we first manually
investigate a small set of 500 commits over all the projects
and attempt to identify what keywords can be leveraged.
Given the diversity of fixes and commit log tokens, we
eventually decide to focus on keywords recurrent in all
commits that are not about feature addition, in order to
reduce the search space. These are: bug, fix, bugzilla, resolve,
remove, merge, branch, conflict, crash, debug. Excluding known
security patches, known bug fixes (whether pure or not),
and those that match the previous keywords, we consider
the remaining patches as the sought noise for the learn-
ing process. Overall, we collected 681, 658, and 679 code
enhancement patches for Linux, Wireshark, and OpenSSL
respectively.
3.1.4 Unlabeled patches
Ultimately, our goal is to provide researchers and practition-
ers with an approach for identifying silent security fixing
patches. Thus, we hypothesize that some fixing patches are
actually unlabeled security patches. To build a dataset of
unlabeled patches where security patches may be included,
we parse all remaining patches (i.e., patches that are not col-
lected in the previous datasets) and further hone in the sub-
set of unlabeled patches that are more relevant to be caught
as security patches. To that end, we focus on commits whose
logs match the regular expression (?i)(bug|vuln1|fix).
Eventually, we collected 147 746, 18 067, and 437 unlabeled
patches for Linux, Wireshark, and OpenSSL respectively.
Table 2 summarizes the statistics on the collected
datasets. We note that, as we postulated, most patches are
unlabeled. Security patches are mostly silent [4]. Even in the
case where a patch is present in a security advisory (i.e.,
the NIST vulnerability database in our case), the associated
commit log may not explicitly use terms that hint to a
security issue. For example, with respect to the regular
expression in Table 1, we note that 15.21% of Wireshark
security patches, 37.19% of Linux security patches and up to
98.78% of OpenSSL security patches do not match security-
related tokens.
TABLE 2: Statistics on the collected datasets
OpenSSL Wireshark Linux Total
Security patches 495 1 398 986 2 879
Pure bug fixing patches (–) 2 1 934 2 477 4 411
Code enhancement patches 618 681 658 1 957
Unlabeled patches 437 18 067 147 746 166 250
3.2 Feature Extraction and Engineering
The objective of the feature extraction step is to transform
the high-volume raw data that we have previously collected
into a reduced dataset that includes only the important facts
about the samples. The feature extraction then considers
both the textual description of the commits (i.e., the mes-
sage describing the purpose of the change) and the code
diff (i.e., the actual modifications performed). The feature
engineering step then deals with the representation of the
extracted facts into numerical vectors to be fed to machine
learning algorithms.
3.2.1 Commit text features
We extract text features by considering all commit logs
as a bag of words, excluding stop words (e.g., “as”, “is”,
“would”, etc.) which are very frequently appearing in any
English document and will not hold any discriminative
power. We then reduce each word to its root form using
Porter’ stemming [43] algorithm. Finally, given the large
number of rooted words, and to limit the curse of dimen-
sionality, we focus on the top 10 of the most recurring
words in commit logs of security patches for the feature
engineering step. This number is selected as a reasonable
vector size to avoid having a too-sparse vector for each
commit, given that commit logs are generally short. We
calculate the inverse document frequency (idf), whose formula
is provided in the equation below. It is a measure of how
much information the word provides, that is, whether it is
common or rare across all commit logs. The feature value for
each commit is then computed as the idfi = log
|D|
|{dj :ti∈dj}|
1. Commits with logs matching keyword “vuln” cannot be directly
considered to be security patches without an audit of the full descrip-
tion and even of the code change.
2. No pure bug fixing dataset because of links missing between bugs
and commits.
6with |D| being the total number of documents in the corpus
and |{dj : ti ∈ dj}| being the number of documents where
term ti appears.
3.2.2 Commit code features
Besides description logs, code change details are available in
a commit and can contribute to improve the efficiency of the
model as demonstrated by Sabetta and Bezzi [36]. Never-
theless in their work, these security researchers considered
all code change tokens as a bag of tokens for embedding.
In our work, we propose to refine the feature selection by
selecting meaningful facts from code to produce an accurate
and explainable model. To that end, on the one hand, we are
inspired by the classification study of Tian et al. [32], and
we extract code facts representing the spread of the patch
(e.g., the number of files/lines modified, etc.), the code units
involved (e.g., the number of expressions, boolean opera-
tors, function calls, etc.). On the other hand, we manually
investigated a sample set of 300 security patches and noticed
a few recurring code facts: for example, sizeof is often
called to fix buffer overflow vulnerabilities, while goto,
continue or break constructs are frequently involved
in security fixes related to loops, etc. Thus, we engineer
two sub-categories of features: code-fix features and security-
sensitive features.
Overall, Table 3 provides an enumeration of the exhaus-
tive list of features used in this study.
TABLE 3: Exhaustive list of features considered for learning
ID code-fix features ID security-sensitive features
F1 #files changed in a commit F1 #Sizeof added
F2 #Loops added F2 #Sizeof removed
F3 #Loops removed F3 F1 - F2
F4 F2 - F3 F4 F1 + F2
F5 F2 + F3 F5-F6 Similar to F1 to F2 for #continue
F6-F9 Similar to F2 to F5 for #ifs F7-F8 Similar to F1 to F2 for #break
F10-F13 Similar to F2 to F5 for #Lines F9-F10 Similar to F1 to F2 for #INTMAX
F14-F17 Similar to F2 to F5 F11-F12 Similar to F1 to F2 for #goto
for #Parenthesized expressions
F18-F21 Similar to F2 to F5 F13-F14 Similar to F1 to F2 for #define
for #Boolean operators
F22-F25 Similar to F2 to F5 F15-F18 Similar to F1 to F4 for #struct
for #Assignments
F26-F29 Similar to F2 to F5 F19-F20 Similar to F1 to F2 for #offset
for #Functions call
F30-F33 Similar to F2 to F5 for #Expression F21-F24 Similar to F1 to F4 for #void
ID text features
W1-W10 10 Most recurrent non-stop words
3.3 Feature Assessment
3.3.1 Statistical analysis
Before leveraging the features that we have engineered
based on manual analysis and intuitive facts, we propose
to assess their fitness with respect to discriminating security
patches against other types of patches. To that end, we
used the Mann-Whitney U test [9] in order to compare the
distribution of a given feature within the set of security
patches against the combined set of pure bug fixing patches
and code enhancement patches. The null hypothesis states
that the feature is distributed independently from whether
the commit fixes a vulnerability or not. If we can reject
the null hypothesis, the feature is distributed differently in
each set and thus is a promising candidate as input for the
machine learning algorithms.
The Mann-Whitney U tests helped discover that a large
majority (i.e., 53 out of 67) of the computed features were
not meaningful unless we rescaled the feature values ac-
cording to the size of the patches. Indeed, for example, code
enhancement patches which can be huge (e.g., addition of
a new program file) may include a number of loops and
sizeof calls, making related features meaningless, unless
their numbers are normalized to the size of code in the
patch. We then applied, for each feature value per patch,
the following formula:
Fnorm =
F
#patch added lines+#patch removed lines
(1)
where the normalized value Fnorm of a feature is computed
by taking into account the patch size. Table 4 provides some
example cases where the statistical tests were successful
against a strict significance level of α = 0.0005 for the p-
value. Due to space limitation, we show only top-3 features
per feature group. For 52 out of 67 features engineered, the
statistical analysis shows high potential of discriminative
power. Nevertheless, in the rest of our experiments, and
following insights from previous studies [35], we keep all
features for the learning process as some combinations may
contribute to yielding an efficient classifier.
TABLE 4: Statistical analysis results for top normalized fea-
tures with highest discriminative potential.
Code-fix features sec.-sensitive features Text features
F6 F16 F24 F11 F22 F24 W2 W4 W6
Mean for
security patches 0.120 0.038 0.110 0.004 0.006 0.350 0.360 0.360 0.350
Mean for
other patches 0.090 0.016 0.050 0.003 0.004 0.330 0.310 0.320 0.330
P-value (MWW) 5e−62 2e−40 4e−103 1e−13 1e−15 6e−47 2e−65 2e−66 7e−50
3.3.2 Classification experiments
The previous statistical analysis assessed the discrimina-
tive power of engineered features with respect to security
patches and the combined set of bug fixing and code
enhancement patches. We propose to further assess the
behaviour of one-class classification models with these fea-
tures applied to the unlabeled patches. Our experiments aim
at answering two questions:
• Can the features help effectively classify unlabeled patches? We
attempt to assess to what extent unlabeled patches that are
flagged as security patches would constitute noise or good
samples to help augment the training data of a binary
classifier.
• Are the feature categories independent and thus splittable for
a Co-Training model learning? The choice of Co-Training as
an approach is based on the hypothesis that the views are
redundant. However, another constraint for the efficacy of
Co-Training is that the features must be independent [38]
(i.e., they do not lead to exactly the same classifications).
Features efficiency. Various verification problems in ma-
chine learning involve identifying a single class label as a
‘target’ class during the training process, and at prediction
time make a judgement as to whether or not an instance is
a member of the target class [44]. In many cases, a one-class
classifier is used in preference to a multi-class classifiers,
mainly because it is inappropriate or challenging to collect
or use non-target data for the given situation. In such cases,
the one-class classifier is actually an outlier detector since it
attempts to differentiate between data that appears normal
(i.e., from the target class) and abnormal with respect to a
training data composed only of normal data. Thus, if the
features are not efficient to fully characterize the normal
data in the training set, many samples classified as normal
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will actually be false positives and thus constitute noise in
an augmented set of normal data.
Given the lack of ground truth (for unlabeled patches),
we assess whether unlabeled patches that are flagged as
security patches by a one-class classifier are noise (i.e., false
positives), and thus deteriorate a binary classification per-
formance when added to a training dataset. The comparison
is done following two experiments:
• First, we compute accuracy, precision and recall metrics
of a classical SVM binary classifier using the existing set
of security patches as positive data and other sets of non-
security (i.e., bug-fix and code enhancement) patches as
negative data.
• Second, we augment the existing set of security patches
with automatically labeled patches after applying a one-
class classifier to the dataset of unlabeled patches. Then
we use this augmented set as the positive data and redo
the first experiment. This workflow is detailed in Figure 5.
If the features are not efficient in characterizing security
patches, the one-class classifier will yield false positives and
false negatives. Thus, when adding false positives to the
ground truth positive data, we will be introducing noise
which will lead to performance degradation. However, if
the features are efficient, we will be increasing the training
set and potentially leading to a better classification perfor-
mance.
Equations (2) and (3) provide the standard formulas for
computing performance metrics, where TP is the number
of True Positives, TN that of True Negatives, FP that of
False Positives and FN that of False Negatives.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
; Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(2)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
; F1 = 2 ∗ Precision ∗ Recall
Precision+ Recall
(3)
Our experiments are performed with 10-Fold cross val-
idation and performance is measured for the target class
of security patches and only on the initial ground truth
samples. Using only the initial set of security patches in
the training dataset, we record an average Accuracy of 58%
(Recall = 56%, Precision= 71%). However, when we augment
the training set with flagged unlabeled patches, we observe
a clear improvement of the accuracy to 79% (Recall = 76%,
Precision= 85%).
The engineered features are effective for characterizing se-
curity patches. They can be used to collect patches for
artificially augmenting a training dataset.
Features independence. The two most closely related work
in the literature [5], [36] rely on commit text or/and code
changes that they treat as simple bags of words. Nev-
ertheless, no experiments were performed to assess the
contribution and complementarity of the different informa-
tion parts. We explore these contributions by evaluating
the overlap among the unlabeled patch subsets that are
flagged when using different feature sets. Figure 6 illustrates
these overlaps with Euler diagrams for the different projects
considered in our study. We note that although there are
overlaps, a large portion of samples are detected exclusively
with each feature set (e.g., in Linux, 99, 513 + 395 = 99, 908
patches out of 99, 513+395+1+37, 161 = 137, 070 patches
–73%– are exclusively detected by either code-fix features or
text features). Nevertheless, we note that security-sensitive
features are more tightly related to code-fix features (except
for 7 patches in OpenSSL, all flagged patches with security-
sensitive features are also flagged with code-fix features3,
which was to be expected given that security-sensitive
features are also about “fixing” code). We then conclude
that code-fix features can be merged with security-sensitive
features to form code features, which constitute a feature set
that is independent from the text features set. As Krogel
and Schefferd demonstrated, Co-Training is only beneficial
if the data sets used in classification are independent [45].
This insight on the sets of engineered features serves as the
foundation for our model learning detailed in the following
paragraphs.
3. This does not mean that security-sensitive features are useless or
redundant. Patches flagged with code-fix features are scarcely flagged
with security-sensitive features.
8Code features (formed by security-sensitive features + code-fix
features) and Text features are independent. They will repre-
sent two distinct views of the data, an essential requirement
for Co-Training.
3.4 Co-Training Model Learning
Experimental results described above have established that
the different features engineered provide meaningful in-
formation for the identification of security patches. Never-
theless, given the large number of these features, manual
construction of detection rules is difficult. We propose to
apply techniques from the area of machine learning to
automatically analyze the code commits and flag those that
are most likely to be delivering security patches.
In the construction of our learning-based classifier, we
stress on the need for practical usefulness to practitioners.
Thus, following recommendations by authors [35] propos-
ing automatic machine-learning approaches to support se-
curity analysts, we strive to build an approach towards
addressing the following challenges:
• Generality: Our feature engineering mixes metadata in-
formation from commit logs, which may or may not be
explicit, with numerical code metrics. It is thus important
that the classifier effectively leverages those heteroge-
neous features to infer an accurate combined detection
model.
• Scalability: Given that most relevant software projects
include thousands of commits that must be analyzed, it
is necessary for the approach to be able to operate on the
large amount of available features in a reasonable time
frame.
• Transparency: In practice, to be helpful for analysts, a clas-
sifier must provide human-comprehensible explanations
with the classification decision. For example, instead of
requiring an analyst to blindly trust a black-box decision
based on deep features, information gain4 (InfoGain) scor-
ing values of human-engineered features can be used as
hints for manual investigation.
3.4.1 Model Learning
Experiments with one-class classification have already
demonstrated that it is possible to build a classifier that
fits with the labeled patches in the ground truth data.
Unfortunately, in our case, a major problem in building
a discriminative classifier is the non-availability of labeled
data: the set of unlabeled patches is significantly larger than
the limited dataset of labeled patches that we could collect.
A classification task for identifying security patches requires
examples of both security and security-irrelevant patches. In
related work from the security industry [5], team members
having relevant skills and experience spent several months
labeling closed-source data to support the model learning.
Since their dataset was not publicly5 available, we propose
to rely on the Co-Training algorithm to solve the non-
availability problem. The algorithm was proposed by Blum
and Mitchell [6], for the problem of semi-supervised learn-
ing where there are both labeled and unlabeled examples.
4. Information gain is a metric based on entropy that allows to tell
how important a given attribute of the feature set is.
5. Our requests to obtain datasets from authors of [5] and [36]
remained unresponded.
The goal of Co-Training is to enhance performance of learn-
ing algorithm when only a small set of labeled examples is
available. The algorithm trains two classifiers separately on
two sufficient and redundant views of the examples and lets
the two classifiers label unlabeled examples for each other.
Figure 7 illustrates the Co-Training process implemented
in this work. An important assumption in Co-Training is
that each view is conditionally independent given the class
label. We have demonstrated in Section 3.3.2 that this was
the case for the different categories of features explored
in this work. Indeed, Co-Training is effective if one of the
classifiers correctly labels a sample that the other classifier
previously misclassified. If both classifiers agree on all the
unlabeled patches, i.e. they are not independent, labeling
the data does not create new information.
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Fig. 7: Co-Training learning model (cf. details in Algorithm 1)
Concretely, given a training set comprising labeled
patches and noted LP , and a set of unlabeled patches UP ,
the algorithm randomly selects µ samples from UP to create
a smaller pool U ′, then executes the process described in
Algorithm 1 during k iterations.
The overall idea behind the Co-Training algorithm steps
is that the classifier h1 adds examples to the labeled set
which are in turn used by the classifier h2 in the next
iteration and vice versa. This process should make classifiers
h1 and h2 to agree with each other after k iterations. In
this study we selected Support Vector Machines (SVM) [46]
as the internal classification algorithm for the Co-Training.
SVM indeed provide tractable baseline performance for
replication and comparisons against state-of-the-art work.
3.4.2 Identification of security patches
Eventually, when the Co-Training is stabilized (i.e., the two
internal classifiers agree), the output classifier can be lever-
aged to classify unlabeled patches. Eventually, in this work,
we consider the classifier built on the code view (which
has been constantly improved due to the co-training) as the
yielded classifier.
4 EXPERIMENTAL STUDY AND RESULTS
Our experiments aim at assessing the performance of the
overall approach, detailing the impact of the Co-Training
algorithm and comparing against the state-of-the-art. We
investigate the following research questions:
RQ-1. What levels of performance can be reached by the Co-
Training algorithm in the classification of patches?
RQ-2. Can we learn to classify patches across projects?
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Fig. 8: Precision, Recall and Accuracy metrics in benchmark evaluation with varying sizes for the unlabeled dataset.
Algorithm 1: Steps for each Co-Training iteration.
input : training set (LP ), unlabeled data (UP )
input : pool U ′
output: U ′: updated pool
output: LP : updated training set
Function getView(x, classifier)
if classifier = C1 then
return Text features(x)
return Code features(x)
Function buildClassifier(first)
vectors = ∅;
if first = True then
foreach x ∈ LP do
vectors = vectors ∪ getV iew(x,C1);
else
foreach x ∈ LP do
vectors = vectors ∪ getV iew(x,C2);
classifier ← train model(SVM, vectors);
return classifier;
h1 ← buildClassifier(True); h2 ← buildClassifier(False);
(P1, N1)← classify(h1, U ′); (P2, N2)← classify(h2, U ′);
LP ← LP ∪ random subset(#p, P1) ∪ random subset(#p, P2);
LP ← LP ∪ random subset(#n,N1) ∪ random subset(#n,N2);
U ′ ← U ′ ∪ random subset(#2 ∗ (p+ n), UP );
RQ-3. How does our Co-Training approach compare against
the state-of-the-art?
RQ-4. Can the approach flag unlabeled patches in the wild?
4.1 RQ1: Classification performance
We perform binary classification experiments to assess the
performance of classifiers in discriminating between secu-
rity patches (positive class) and non-security patches (neg-
ative class). We remind that, as illustrated in Figure 4, the
non-security patches consist in the pure bug-fix patches and
code-enhancement patches. These experiments, similarly to
past studies [5], [32], [36], report performance based on the
ground-truth data (i.e., unlabeled patches are not considered
to compute the performance score).
Our first experiment investigates the performance of
the Co-Training approach when varying the size of the
unlabeled dataset. In this experiment, we randomly split
the labeled patch sets into two equal size subsets: one
subset is used in conjunction with the unlabeled dataset
for the Co-Training, while the other is used for testing.
Precision, Recall and Accuracy are computed based on the
test set. Figure 8 presents the results, showing precision
measurements above 90%, and recall measurements be-
tween 74% and 91%. We do not show evaluation graphs
for OpenSSL dataset since this dataset included only 436
unlabeled patches. With this quantity of unlabeled data, our
approach yields with OpenSSL the lowest Precision metrics
at 74%, but the highest Recall at 93%. We note that, when
using the whole dataset (including all projects data) the per-
formance remains high. The best performing state-of-the-art
approach in the literature for identifying security-relevant
commits has reported Precision and Recall metrics at 80%
and 43% respectively [36]. Tian et al. have also reported
F1-Measure performance around 70% for identifying bug
fixing commits [32], while the F1-measure performance of
our approach is 89% on average.
Our second experiment assesses the contribution of the
feature set on the one hand, and of the choice of Co-Training
as learning algorithm on the other hand. We replicate the
SVM binary classifier proposed by Sabetta and Bezzi [36]
and apply it on our labeled patches. We also build a similar
classifier, however using our own feature set. We perform
10-fold cross validations for all classifiers and evaluate the
performance of the classifier in identifying labeled security
patches in the whole dataset. Results in Table 5 indicate that
our feature set is more effective than those used by the state-
of-the-art, while the Co-Training semi-supervised model is
more effective than the classical binary classification model.
TABLE 5: Importance∗ of Classification method and feature
set
Precision Recall F1-measure
SVM binary classification
(with features of Sabetta & Bezzi [36]) 0.60 0.63 0.61
SVM binary classification
(with our feature set) 0.85 0.86 0.85
Co-Training + SVM
(with our feature set) 0.96 0.90 0.93
∗Performance metrics are for classifying ’security patches’. Due to
space limitation, we refer the reader to the replication package for all
evaluation data.
Given that our code-fix features overlap with features
used by Tian et al. [32] for classifying bug fix patches,
we present performance comparisons with the different
feature sets. Results in Table 6 confirm that our extended
feature set (with vulnerability-sensitive features) allows to
increase performance by up to 26 percentage points. The
performance differences between projects further confirm
that the features of Tian et al. [32] are indeed very specific
to Linux.
TABLE 6: F-Measure Comparison: Our features vs features
in [32]∗
OpenSSL Wireshark Linux Whole data
Co-Training + SVM
(with our feature set) 0.93 0.89 0.94 0.93
Co-Training + SVM
(with feature set of Tian & al. [32]) 0.65 0.71 0.96 0.77
SVM binary classification
(with features of Tian & al. [32]) 0.69 0.77 0.99 0.69
This comparison serves to assess the impact of our security-sensitive
features
RQ1IOur approach (Co-Training + feature set) yields a
highly accurate classifier for classifying patches with respect
to whether they are security-relevant or not. Our perfor-
mance results are above those reported by prior work for
classifying patches.J
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4.2 RQ2: Cross-project classification
In the wild of software development projects, as reflected by
the case of OpenSSL, there can be limitations in the available
labeled data. Thus, it could be beneficial if practitioners
can train a model by leveraging data from another project
and still obtain reasonable classification performance on
a distinct target project. We investigate this possibility on
our datasets considering that they are written in the same
programming language (C). Table 7 shows the classifica-
tion performance results, in terms of Recall and Precision,
when training on one project and applying the model to
another. We note that training on Wireshark data yields
reasonable (although not optimal) performance on OpenSSL
patches, while training on OpenSSL interestingly offers high
performance on Linux patches. In both cases, the converse
is not true. Variations in cross-project performances may
be explained by factors such as coding styles differences,
code base size or different security patching policies among
projects. Future work will investigate effects of these factors.
TABLE 7: Results of cross-project classification
Training on
OpenSSL Wireshark Linux
precision/recall precision/recall precision/recall
Te
st
in
g
on OpenSSL (0.93 /0.94) 0.71 / 0.48 0.42 / 0.88
Wireshark 0.53 / 0.88 (0.93 / 0.85) 0.50 / 0.95
Linux 0.89 / 0.78 0.45 / 0.93 (0.95 / 0.84)
RQ2ICross-project classification can yield comparatively
good performance in some cases of combinations, such as
when training on OpenSSL to classify Linux patches.J
4.3 RQ3: Comparison with the state-of-the-art
While we report a F-Measure performance of around 90%,
the most recent state-of-the-art on security commit clas-
sification (i.e., [36]) reports performance metrics around
55%. Our experiments however are performed on different
datasets because the dataset used by Sabetta & Bezzi was
not made available. Thus, we replicate the essential compo-
nents of the best performing approach in their work [36]
(i.e., SVM bi-classification with bag-of-words features of
code and log), and can therefore compare6 their approach
and ours in Table 8.
TABLE 8: Comparison of F-Measure metrics
OpenSSL Wireshark Linux Whole data
Our Approach 0.93 0.89 0.94 0.91
Sabetta & Bezzi [36] 0.45 0.45 0.67 0.61
RQ3IOur Co-Training approach outperforms the state-of-
the-art in the identification of security-relevant commits.J
4.4 RQ4: Flagging unlabeled patches
Performance computation presented in previous subsec-
tions are based on cross validations where training and test
data are randomly sampled. Such validations often suffer
from the data leakage problem [47], which leads to the
construction overly optimistic models that are practically
useless and cannot be used in production. For example, in
our case, data leakage can happen if the training set includes
security patches that should actually only be available in the
6. Note that the recorded performance of the replicated approach on
our dataset is in line with the performance reported by the authors in
their paper [36].
testing set (i.e., we would be learning from the future). We
thus propose to divide our whole dataset, with patches from
all projects, following the commits timeline, and select the
last year’s commits as test set. The previous commits are all
used as training set. We then train a classifier using our Co-
Training approach and apply it to the 475 commits of the
test set. To ensure confidence in our conclusions, we focus
on automatically measuring the performance based only on
the last year patches for which the labels are known (i.e., the
patches coming from the security patches dataset, the pure
bug fix patches dataset, and the code enhancement patches
dataset as illustrated in Figure 4). Overall, we recorded
precision and recall metrics of 0.64 and 0.67 respectively.
In a final experiment, we propose to audit 10 unlabeled
patches flagged as security patches by a Co-Training clas-
sifier built by learning on the whole data. We focus on the
top-10 unlabeled patches that are flagged by the classifier
with the highest prediction probabilities. Two authors man-
ually cross-examine the patches to assess the plausibility
of the classification. We further solicit the opinion of two
researchers (who are not authors of this paper) to audit the
flagged security patches. For each presented patch, patch
auditors must indicate whether yes or no they accept it as
a security patch. Auditors must further indicate in a Likert
scale to what extent the associated details on the features
with highest InfoGain was relevant to the reason why they
would confirm the classification. Among the 10 considered
patches, 5 happen to be for Linux, 3 for OpenSSL and 2 are
for Wireshark.
We compute Precision@10 following the formula :
Precision@k =
1
#auditors
#auditors∑
i=1
#confirmed patches
k
Ideally, a security patch should be confirmed experimen-
tally by attempting an exploit. Nevertheless, this requires
extremely high expertise for our subjects (Linux, OpenSSL
and Wireshark) and significant time. Instead, and to limit
experimenter bias, auditors were asked to check at least
whether issues fixed by the patches have similar occurrences
in line with known potential vulnerabilities. For example,
one of the flagged security patches is “fixing a memory leak”
in OpenSSL (cf. commit 9ee1c83). The literature indicates
this as a known category of vulnerability which is easily
exploitable [48].
At the end of the auditing process, we record a Preci-
sion@10 metric of 0.55. Although this performance in the
wild may seem limited, it is actually comparable to the per-
formance recorded in the lab by the state-of-the-art, and is a
very significant improvement over a random classifier that,
given the small proportion of security patches [26], would
almost always be wrong. Figure 9 indicates the distribution
of the Likert scale values for the satisfaction rates indicated
by the auditors for the usefulness of leveraging the features
with highest InfoGain to confirm the classification.
RQ4IThe approach helps to catch some silent security
patches. Features with high InfoGain can be useful to guide
auditors.J
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Fig. 9: Do the highlighted features provide relevant hints for
manual review of flagged patches?
5 DISCUSSION
Threats to validity. As with most empirical studies, our
study carries some threats to the validity. An important
threat to internal validity in our study is the experimenter
bias when we personally labeled code enhancement com-
mits. However, we have indicated the systematic steps for
making the decisions in order to minimize the bias. As a
threat to external validity, the generalizability of the results
can be questioned since we could only manually assess a
small sample set of flagged unlabeled patches. Given that
our ranking is based on prediction probability, assessment of
top results is highly indicative of the approach performance.
Finally, threats to construct validity concern our evaluation
criteria. Nevertheless, we used standard metrics such as
Precision, Recall, F-Measure and Likert scale to evaluate the
effectiveness of our approach.
Excluded features. During feature extraction, we have opted
to ignore information related to the author of a commit or
the file where the commit occurs, as such information can
lead to an overfitted model. Furthermore, we expect our
classifier to be useful across projects, and thus we should not
include project-specific features. In contrast, although we
found that some selected features have, individually, little
discriminative power, we keep them for the learning as, in
combinations, they may help yield efficient classifiers.
Benefit of unlabeled data. Generally, labeling is expen-
sive and time consuming, while unlabeled data is often
freely available in large scales. Our Co-Training approach
successfully leverages such data and turns a weakness in
our problem setting into an essential part of the solution.
Furthermore, it should be noted that, by construction, our
dataset is highly imbalanced. Although some data balancing
techniques (e.g., SMOTE [49]) could be used, we chose
to focus our experiments on validating the suitability of
our feature set with the Co-Training for semi-supervised
learning. Future work could investigate other optimizations.
Future work. We plan to apply this approach to security
patch identification to Java projects after collecting the nec-
essary training data (e.g., from [26]). Such a classifier could
then help the open source community report more vulnera-
bilities and fixes to security advisories. Besides SVM, which
was used to ensure tractable performance comparisons with
the state-of-the-art, we will investigate some Boosting al-
gorithms. Finally, we will consider adapting other security-
sensitive features (e.g., stall ratio, coupling propagation, etc.
from [50]) to the cases of code differences to assess their
impact on the classification performance.
6 CONCLUSION
We have investigated the problem of identifying security
patches, i.e., patches that address security issues in a code
base. Our study explores a Co-Training approach which
we demonstrate to be effective. Concretely, we proposed to
consider the commit log and the code change diff as two
independent views of a patch. The Co-Training algorithm
then iteratively converges on a classifier which outperforms
the state-of-the-art. We further show experimentally that
this performance is due to the suitability of our feature set
as well as the the effectiveness of the Co-Training algorithm.
Finally, experiments on unlabeled patches show that our
model can help uncover silent fixes of vulnerabilities.
Availability: We provide the dataset, scripts, and results
as a replication package at http://github.com/vulnCatcher/
vulnCatcher
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